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Education of City New York, 24 U.S.L. WEE 4178 (U.S. April 10,
1956) (5-4 decision). Although it is not readily ascertainable, the
future effect of this decision may prove to be extreme. Hence
former cases discussed above may be overruled. But it is the
opinion of the writer that if this case is to be applied as a comprehensive rule and not easily distinguishable on it6 facts, it is unsound in principle. It should also be noted that this was a 5 to 4
decision which although binding law at the present, may cast
some doubt as to the future.
M. J. P.
CoNsTIrTnuONAL LAw-DUE PRocEss-WAVm
JECT TO COMPOSITION OF GnAND

OF

RiGHT TO O-

JRm.-D (Poret), arrested in 1951

and charged with rape, eluded officers and fled the State of Louisiana. He was indicted for the crime of rape shortly thereafter, but
his location was not discovered until about a year later when it
was learned that he was imprison in Tennessee. Upon completion
of the Tennessee prison term in 1953, D was returned to Louisiana
where he was arraigned. He pleaded to the indictment and entered
a motion for severance, another defendant (Labat) having been
joined with him. The motion was denied and D then entered a
motion to quash the indictment because of the systematic exclusion
of Negroes from the grand jury which had returned the indictment.
The motion was denied upon the ground that it was made too late.
The Louisiana supreme court affirmed, holding that § 202 of the
Louisiana Criminal Code as interpreted, required that all such objections be made before the end of the third judicial day following
the term of the grand jury by which the attacked indictment had
been returned and that D's motion, therefore, came more than a
year and a half too late. Held, that a state may attach reasonable
time limitations to the assertion of federal constitutional rights. "The
test is whether the defendant has had 'a reasonable opportunity to
have the issue as to the claimed right heard and determined by the
State court."' The fact that D was a fugitive does not give him
immunity from the operation of a valid state statute. The fact that
D had no lawyer during the eighty-seven day period from his indictment to the expiration of his time to file the motion to quash
does not alter the situation for he, by his own voluntary action,
"failed to avail himself of Louisiana's adequate remedies." Conviction affirmed. Poret and Labat, Petitionersv. Louisiana,850 U.S.
91 (1955).
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CASE COMMENTS
The test as to whether an accused is denied a constitutional
right by state restrictions on the time or method of asserting some
right guaranteed by the Constitution was clearly set forth in the
case of Parkerv. Illinois,333 U.S. 571 (1947), where the court said,
"The question turns on whether the party has 'a reasonable opportunity to have the issue as to the claimed right heard and determined' by the State court." By way of dictum in Williams v. Georgia, 349 U.S. 375, 382 (1955), dealing with a question involving a
petit jury the court stated, "A state procedural rule which forbids
the raising of federal questions at late stages in the case, or by
any other than a prescribed method has been recognized as a valid
exercise of state power." Another very recent case illustrates the
application of the test above set forth. Reece v. Georgia, 350 U.S.
85 (1955), involved an objection to the composition of a grand
jury which the state maintained was made too late since it came
after indictment, a statute providing that such objections must be
made prior to the return of the indictment. It was provided by
statute that the order impaneling or reconvening a grand jury must
list all those against whom a case was to be presented. The court
reversed accused's conviction because he was not given a "reasonable
opportunity" to exercise his federal right to object to the composition of the grand jury since (1) he was not apprised of the fact
that charges against him were to undergo grand jury investigation
and, (2) he was without assistance of counsel until after the indictment was returned.
The general test then, as well as its application, is clear.
Another very important consideration in the Poret case is that
of waiver. The question of waiver underlies the basic "reasonable
opportunity" issue in this case. The Louisiana statute provides a
definite method for attacking the composition of a grand jury but
whether in fact D had a reasonable opportunity to take advantage
of that procedure and whether he voluntarily waived this opportunity were the decisive questions before the court. Actually, since
D did flee, the answers to these questions depend upon facts which
never developed and about which only conjecture is possible. In deciding upon the law applicable to any concrete factual issue, however,
the court cannot speculate as to what might have happened had D not
fled nor assume any illegal denial of D's rights in the absence of any
attempt by him to assert such rights. It seems then that a necessary
step in the court's process of decision was the making of an assumption that but for D's disappearance such "reasonable opportunity"
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would have existed. Therefore D can be said to have waived his
rights by failing to avail himself of the "existing adequate remedy."
Any other hypothesis which would serve as well in expediting the
administration of justice could not easily be formulated, although,
as the dissenting opinion indicates, such hypothesis might on another
set of facts permit an accused to be deprived of his right to be
indicted by a fairly constituted grand jury. This problem, however,
can be met and decided when it arises; the facts may well deny the
use of the same hypothesis.
While commencement of a state criminal prosecution by indictment through grand jury action is not essential under the Constitution, Hurtado v. California, 110 U.S. 516 (1884), if this form
of accusatory procedure is used the grand jury must be fairly chosen,
Cassel v. Texas, 839 U.S. 282 (1950). The court did not change
nor did it detract from this rule in the Poret case; it only recognized
that justice cannot be thwarted nor public protection from crime
made a mere sham through allowing criminals to voluntarily procrastinate in the assertion of their constitutional rights. D was fairly
tried and convicted and by his own action waived the right to later
object to matters preliminary to such trial and conviction.
B. F. D.
COunTs-SuPjfVtisoRY PowERs-ENJOnMENT

OF FEDEiAL NAR-

concs AiENT FRom TEsrTIFNCG IN STATE CouaT.-A federal narcotics
agent obtained narcotics from the petitioner under a defective search
warrant. Consequently in a federal prosecution this evidence was
suppressed and the indictment based thereon was dismissed. Thereafter petitioner was charged with possession of narcotics in violation
of state law. He filed a motion in the federal district court to enjoin
the agent from testifying in the state action and thereby submitting
the same evidence against him in the state court which was suppressed in the federal prosecution. Relief was denied and the United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari. Held, that injunctive relief
should be granted. Viewing the question as solely concerning the
federal court's supervisory power over federal law enforcement officers, the majority took the view that the policy of the Federal Rules
of Criminal Procedure governing searches and seizures would be
defeated if a federal officer could use the fruits of an unlawful search
in state proceedings. Four Justices dissented, expressing the view
that the holding of the majority could not properly be rested on
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